C语言 使用 OpenSSL API 以编程方式验证证书链

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时间:2020-09-02 06:12:49  来源:igfitidea点击:

Programmatically verify certificate chain using OpenSSL API

copensslx509certificate-storepkix

提问by clemej

This is very similar to other questions but the ones I've looked at either don't have an answer or don't quite ask the same question. I have a self-signed CA certificate, and two other certificates that are signed with that CA certificate. I'm fairly sure the certificates are correct, because 'openssl verify' works:

这与其他问题非常相似,但我看过的问题要么没有答案,要么没有问出相同的问题。我有一个自签名 CA 证书,以及另外两个使用该 CA 证书签名的证书。我相当确定证书是正确的,因为“openssl verify”有效:

$ openssl verify -CAfile ca.pem server.pem
server.pem: OK

(The above is from memory, I don't have them in front of me, so it may be slightly off).

(以上是凭记忆,我面前没有,所以可能略有偏差)。

Now I want to verify the certificates programatically. I have a utility function with pseudocode below:

现在我想以编程方式验证证书。我有一个带有伪代码的实用程序函数:

int verify_cert(X509 *cert, X509 *cacert)
{
     int ret;
     X509_STORE *store;
     X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;

     store = X509_STORE_new();
     X590_STORE_add_cert(store, cacert);

     ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
     X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, cert, NULL);

     ret = X590_verify_cert(ctx);

     /* check for errors and clean up */
}

My problem is that the above code always returns 'failed to find issuer certificate'. What have I done wrong? I believe I am creating a new store, adding the cacert, creating a new context, and adding the child cert to be verified to the context with a pointer to the store which contains the CA. I'm pretty obviously doing something wrong, but I'm unsure what.

我的问题是上面的代码总是返回“无法找到颁发者证书”。我做错了什么?我相信我正在创建一个新商店,添加 cacert,创建一个新上下文,并使用指向包含 CA 的商店的指针将要验证的子证书添加到上下文中。我很明显做错了什么,但我不确定是什么。

Any ideas?

有任何想法吗?

Update:I'm aware I can save these certs to disk and use something like X509_LOOKUP_file or something similar. I'm looking for a solution that doesn't touch the disk unnecessarily.

更新:我知道我可以将这些证书保存到磁盘并使用类似 X509_LOOKUP_file 或类似的东西。我正在寻找一种不会不必要地接触磁盘的解决方案。

采纳答案by Mr Ed

You can use the normal validation routines (see How do you verify a public key was issued by your private CA?), like the -verify function in OpenSSL does. You need to create a lookup method (X509_LOOKUP_METHOD) like X509_LOOKUP_file(), but which works with a character string instead of a filename. The code for X509_LOOKUP_buffer() is as follows.

您可以使用普通的验证例程(请参阅如何验证您的私有 CA 发布的公钥?),就像 OpenSSL 中的 -verify 函数一样。您需要创建一个类似于 X509_LOOKUP_file() 的查找方法 (X509_LOOKUP_METHOD),但它使用字符串而不是文件名。X509_LOOKUP_buffer() 的代码如下。

Header file by_buffer.h:

头文件by_buffer.h:

/* File:   by_buffer.h */

#ifndef BY_BUFFER_H
#define    BY_BUFFER_H

#include <openssl/x509.h>

#ifdef    __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
#define X509_L_BUF_LOAD    1
#define X509_LOOKUP_load_buf(x,name,type) \
        X509_LOOKUP_ctrl((x),X509_L_BUF_LOAD,(name),(long)(type),NULL)
X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *X509_LOOKUP_buffer(void);

#ifdef    __cplusplus
}
#endif

#endif    /* BY_BUFFER_H */

The c program by_buffer.c:

c程序by_buffer.c:

/* by_buffer.c - copied and modified from crypto/x509/by_file.c */
/* Copyright (C) - should be the same as for OpenSSL
*/
#include "by_buffer.h"

#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <errno.h>

#include "../crypto/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>

static int by_buffer_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argc,
    long argl, char **ret);
X509_LOOKUP_METHOD x509_buffer_lookup=
    {
    "Load buffer into cache",
    NULL,        /* new */
    NULL,        /* free */
    NULL,         /* init */
    NULL,        /* shutdown */
    by_buffer_ctrl,    /* ctrl */
    NULL,        /* get_by_subject */
    NULL,        /* get_by_issuer_serial */
    NULL,        /* get_by_fingerprint */
    NULL,        /* get_by_alias */
    };

X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *X509_LOOKUP_buffer(void)
    {
    return(&x509_buffer_lookup);
    }

static int by_buffer_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argp, long argl,
         char **ret)
    {
    int ok=0;
    char *certBuf;

    switch (cmd)
        {
    case X509_L_BUF_LOAD:
        if (argl == X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT)
            {
            X509err(X509_F_BY_FILE_CTRL,X509_R_LOADING_DEFAULTS);
            }
        else
            {
            if(argl == X509_FILETYPE_PEM)
                ok = (X509_load_cert_crl_buf(ctx,argp,
                    X509_FILETYPE_PEM) != 0);
            else
                ok = (X509_load_cert_buf(ctx,argp,(int)argl) != 0);
            }
        break;
        }
    return(ok);
    }

int X509_load_cert_buf(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *certBuf, int type)
    {
    int ret=0;
    BIO *in=NULL;
    int i,count=0;
    X509 *x=NULL;

    if (certBuf == NULL) return(1);
        in=BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
        if(in==NULL) goto err;

    if (type == X509_FILETYPE_PEM)
        {
        for (;;)
            {
            x=PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in,NULL,NULL,NULL);
            if (x == NULL)
                {
                if ((ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) ==
                    PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) && (count > 0))
                    {
                    ERR_clear_error();
                    break;
                    }
                else
                    {
                    X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE,
                        ERR_R_PEM_LIB);
                    goto err;
                    }
                }
            i=X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx->store_ctx,x);
            if (!i) goto err;
            count++;
            X509_free(x);
            x=NULL;
            }
        ret=count;
        }
    else if (type == X509_FILETYPE_ASN1)
        {
        x=d2i_X509_bio(in,NULL);
        if (x == NULL)
            {
            X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
            goto err;
            }
        i=X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx->store_ctx,x);
        if (!i) goto err;
        ret=i;
        }
    else
        {
        X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE,X509_R_BAD_X509_FILETYPE);
        goto err;
        }
err:
    if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
    if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
    return(ret);
    }

int X509_load_crl_buf(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *certBuf, int type)
    {
    int ret=0;
    BIO *in=NULL;
    int i,count=0;
    X509_CRL *x=NULL;

    if (certBuf == NULL) return(1);
    //in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
        in=BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());

        if(in==NULL) goto err;

    if (type == X509_FILETYPE_PEM)
        {
        for (;;)
            {
            x=PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(in,NULL,NULL,NULL);
            if (x == NULL)
                {
                if ((ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) ==
                    PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) && (count > 0))
                    {
                    ERR_clear_error();
                    break;
                    }
                else
                    {
                    X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE,
                        ERR_R_PEM_LIB);
                    goto err;
                    }
                }
            i=X509_STORE_add_crl(ctx->store_ctx,x);
            if (!i) goto err;
            count++;
            X509_CRL_free(x);
            x=NULL;
            }
        ret=count;
        }
    else if (type == X509_FILETYPE_ASN1)
        {
        x=d2i_X509_CRL_bio(in,NULL);
        if (x == NULL)
            {
            X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
            goto err;
            }
        i=X509_STORE_add_crl(ctx->store_ctx,x);
        if (!i) goto err;
        ret=i;
        }
    else
        {
        X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE,X509_R_BAD_X509_FILETYPE);
        goto err;
        }
err:
    if (x != NULL) X509_CRL_free(x);
    if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
    return(ret);
    }

int X509_load_cert_crl_buf(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, const char *certBuf, int type)
{
    STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *inf;
    X509_INFO *itmp;
    BIO *in;
    int i, count = 0;
    if(type != X509_FILETYPE_PEM)
        return X509_load_cert_buf(ctx, certBuf, type);
        in = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
    if(!in) {
        X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_CRL_FILE,ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
        return 0;
    }
        BIO_write(in, certBuf, strlen(certBuf));
    inf = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
    BIO_free(in);
    if(!inf) {
        X509err(X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_CRL_FILE,ERR_R_PEM_LIB);
        return 0;
    }
    for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_INFO_num(inf); i++) {
        itmp = sk_X509_INFO_value(inf, i);
        if(itmp->x509) {
            X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx->store_ctx, itmp->x509);
            count++;
        }
        if(itmp->crl) {
            X509_STORE_add_crl(ctx->store_ctx, itmp->crl);
            count++;
        }
    }
    sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(inf, X509_INFO_free);
    return count;
}

Routine in C++ which calls the above routines:

调用上述例程的 C++ 例程:

#include "by_buffer.h"
static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *certBuf);
static X509 *load_cert(const char *certBuf);

int validateKey(const char *rsaKeyCA, const char *rsaCertificate) {
    int ret=0;
    X509_STORE *cert_ctx=NULL;
    X509_LOOKUP *lookup=NULL;

    cert_ctx=X509_STORE_new();
    if (cert_ctx == NULL) goto end;

    OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();

    lookup=X509_STORE_add_lookup(cert_ctx,X509_LOOKUP_buffer());
    if (lookup == NULL)
        goto end;

    if(!X509_LOOKUP_load_buf(lookup,rsaKeyCA,X509_FILETYPE_PEM))
        goto end;

    lookup=X509_STORE_add_lookup(cert_ctx,X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir());
    if (lookup == NULL)
        goto end;

    X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup,NULL,X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT);

    ret = check(cert_ctx, rsaCertificate);
end:
    if (cert_ctx != NULL) X509_STORE_free(cert_ctx);

    return ret;
}

static X509 *load_cert(const char *certBuf)
{
    X509 *x=NULL;
    BIO *cert;

    if ((cert=BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL)
        goto end;

    BIO_write(cert, certBuf, strlen(certBuf));

    x=PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(cert,NULL, NULL, NULL);
end:
    if (cert != NULL) BIO_free(cert);
    return(x);
}

static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *certBuf)
{
    X509 *x=NULL;
    int i=0,ret=0;
    X509_STORE_CTX *csc;

    x = load_cert(certBuf);
    if (x == NULL)
        goto end;

    csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
    if (csc == NULL)
        goto end;
    X509_STORE_set_flags(ctx, 0);
    if(!X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc,ctx,x,0))
        goto end;
    ////// See crypto/asn1/t_x509.c for ideas on how to access and print the values
    //printf("X.509 name: %s\n", x->name);
    i=X509_verify_cert(csc);
    X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);

    ret=0;
end:
    ret = (i > 0);
    if (x != NULL)
        X509_free(x);

    return(ret);
}

回答by Steve Miskovetz

I encountered this problem myself and started off with code very close to the OP. My certificate chain included 3 certificates: Certificate 1 (root-ca) Issuer: root-ca Subject: root-ca Certificate 2 (signing-ca) Issuer: root-ca Subject: signing-ca Certificate 3 (device) Issuer: signing-ca Subject: device

我自己遇到了这个问题,并从非常接近 OP 的代码开始。我的证书链包括 3 个证书:证书 1 (root-ca) 颁发者:root-ca 主题:root-ca 证书 2 (signing-ca) 颁发者:root-ca 主题:signing-ca 证书 3(设备)颁发者:signing- ca 主题:设备

I wanted to verify the device certificate. My ca.pem equivalent (wrt OP) contained the root-ca and signing-ca.

我想验证设备证书。我的 ca.pem 等价物(wrt OP)包含 root-ca 和签名-ca。

The X509_verify_cert function needs the entire certificate chain all the way to the root (root-ca & signing-ca) in the X509_store.

X509_verify_cert 函数需要整个证书链一直到 X509_store 中的根(root-ca 和签名-ca)。

Below is my code that works for me. Checks on return values were omitted to lean the code down.

以下是适用于我的代码。省略了对返回值的检查以简化代码。

int getIssuerCert(X509_STORE *x509_store){
    STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *inf;
    X509_INFO *itmp;
    BIO *in;
    int i, count = 0;

    in = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
    BIO_write(in, issuerCertStr, strlen(issuerCertStr)); //string containing root-ca & signing-ca
    inf = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
    if(in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
    for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_INFO_num(inf); i++) {
        itmp = sk_X509_INFO_value(inf, i);
        if(itmp->x509) {
            X509_STORE_add_cert(x509_store, itmp->x509);
            count++;
        }
        if(itmp->crl) {
            X509_STORE_add_crl(x509_store, itmp->crl);
            count++;
        }
    }
    sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(inf, X509_INFO_free);
    return 0;
}


int verify_cert(){
    int ret = 0;
    X509 *devCert = NULL;
    X509_STORE *x509_store = NULL;
    X509_STORE_CTX *x509_store_ctx = NULL;

    OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
    devCert = getDeviceCert(); //  Returns X509 pointer

    x509_store = X509_STORE_new();
    X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(x509_store, verify_cb);
    X509_STORE_set_flags(x509_store, 0);

    x509_store_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();

    X509_STORE_CTX_init(x509_store_ctx, x509_store, devCert, NULL)

    X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(x509_store_ctx, X509_PURPOSE_ANY);
    ret = X509_verify_cert(x509_store_ctx);

    if(x509_store_ctx != NULL) X509_STORE_CTX_free(x509_store_ctx);
    if(x509_store != NULL) X509_STORE_free(x509_store);
    if(devCert != NULL) X509_free(devCert);
    EVP_cleanup();
    return ret;
}

I didn't need to create any lookup methods. The key for me was looping through my certificates from my string in memory so I had all the certificates I need to complete the chain. The string is equivalent to what I would have fed into openssl verify for the option -CAfile.

我不需要创建任何查找方法。对我来说,关键是从内存中的字符串遍历我的证书,因此我拥有完成链所需的所有证书。该字符串相当于我为选项 -CAfile 输入 openssl verify 的内容。

Also, make sure your X509 pointers are not null when the are used.

此外,请确保您的 X509 指针在使用时不为空。

回答by querentns

A possibleanswer (don't have the rep points to add a comment, sorry): the manpage for SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)says,

一个可能的答案(没有代表点添加评论,抱歉):联机帮助页SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)说,

When building its own certificate chain, an OpenSSL client/server will try to fill in
missing certificates from CAfile/CApath, if the certificate chain was not explicitly
specified (see SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3), SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3).

(Failure to match parens theirs, not mine.)

(未能匹配他们的父母,而不是我的。)

Which seems to mean that, as an alternative to SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3), it should be possible to use SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)or SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)-- both of which take a X509 *arg. Thus obviating the need for Mr Ed's solution as seen above.

这似乎意味着,作为 的替代方案SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3),应该可以使用SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(3)or SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)-- 两者都采用X509 *arg。从而消除了对 Ed 先生解决方案的需要,如上所示。

回答by Riyadh

I think, you can use "X509_STORE_set_verify_cb" to add a callback to identify the actual error:

我认为,您可以使用“X509_STORE_set_verify_cb”添加回调来识别实际错误:

static int  verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    if (!ok)
    {
        /* check the error code and current cert*/
        X509 *currentCert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
        int certError = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
        int depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
        printCert(currentCert);
        printf("Error depth %d, certError %d", depth, certError)
    }

    return(ok);
}

int verify_cert(X509 *cert, X509 *cacert)
{
     int ret;
     X509_STORE *store;
     X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;

     store = X509_STORE_new();
     X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(store, verify_cb);
     X590_STORE_add_cert(store, cacert);

     ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
     X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, cert, NULL);

     ret = X590_verify_cert(ctx);

     /* check for errors and clean up */
}

Unless we know the error code it is difficult to guess the actual problem. The code otherwise looks OK.

除非我们知道错误代码,否则很难猜测实际问题。否则代码看起来没问题。

回答by Paul

Please take a look at SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations ()function: http://www.openssl.org/docs/ssl/SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations.html

请看一下SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations ()函数:http: //www.openssl.org/docs/ssl/SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations.html

SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations() specifies the locations for ctx, at which CA certificates for verification purposes are located. The certificates available via CAfile and CApath are trusted.

SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations() 指定 ctx 的位置,用于验证目的的 CA 证书所在的位置。通过 CAfile 和 CApath 提供的证书是可信的。

You can generate a CA certificate file containing both ca.pem server.pem:

您可以生成包含 ca.pem server.pem 的 CA 证书文件:

 #!/bin/sh
 rm CAfile.pem
 for i in ca.pem server.pem ; do
   openssl x509 -in $i -text >> CAfile.pem
 done

And then set CAfilevariable to point to CAfile.pemfile.

然后设置CAfile变量指向CAfile.pem文件。

Hope it helps !

希望能帮助到你 !